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Nottebohm’s Nightmare: Have We Exorcised the Ghosts of WWII Detention
Programs or Do They Still Haunt Guantanamo?
Cindy G. Buys 1
This article has been revised from the version published in 2011 in order to reflect several
corrections.
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Frederich Nottebohm was the subject of a famous decision by the International Court of
Justice that is mentioned in almost every international law text book published in the United
States. 2 The Nottebohm judgment deals with the narrow legal issue of whether Guatemala must
respect Liechtenstein’s hasty grant of citizenship to Mr. Nottebohm during World War II. 3
However, the story of how Mr. Nottebohm’s case came to the world court exposes a little known
program run by the United States during World War II in which the United States pressured
Latin American countries like Guatemala to identify persons of German nationality or ancestry
and turn them over to the United States for internment for the duration of the war. Many of these
persons were assumed to be Nazi sympathizers and were arrested and detained for lengthy
periods of time on the basis of mere accusations unsupported by any real investigation or
evidence. Sadly, as with the Japanese-Americans who were thrown into detention camps during
World War II, 4 U.S. and international law at the time allowed these arrests and detentions of
persons of German ancestry or nationality without requiring any further proof of Nazi
sympathies, much less subversive activities.
Originally, the U.S. Latin American Detention Program was primarily motivated by
national security concerns, especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
However, as time went on, the United States continued detaining persons who, like the
Nottebohms, had been deemed to present little or no security risk because it was beneficial for
the United States and Latin American governments to do so for economic reasons. Thus, what
2

The Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (1955). See generally, Janis & Noyes, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 340 (3d ed. 2006); Damrosch et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 463
(5th ed. 2009).
3
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Guatemala did not have to respect that grant of citizenship
because Nottebohm lacked sufficient genuine links to Liechtenstein. See id.
4
See Koramatsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) (American citizen of Japanese descent challenged
constitutionality of “Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S.
Army which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area.”);
see also Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) and Proclamation No. 2525 (Dec. 7, 1941)
(declaring all natives or citizens of Japan found in the United States to be enemy aliens subject to detention).
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started as a national security measure evolved into a program aimed at increasing U.S. economic
influence in Latin America.
This article begins by recounting the story of Mr. Frederich Nottebohm, a German-born
businessman from Guatemala, and how he and his extended family came to be caught up in the
U.S. Latin American Detention Program. 5 It next relates the motivations behind the creation of
the program and analyzes the legality of the program under both United States and international
law existing at the time. The article then examines the extent to which the law has evolved and
whether the changes in the law would lead to a different result today. The article draws parallels
between the arrest, detention and trial of alleged “alien enemies” during World War II and those
practices being employed today with respect to alleged “unlawful enemy combatants” in the
current fight against terrorism. Finally, the article suggests some lessons that may be learned
regarding the treatment of so-called “alien enemies” during times of conflict, especially relevant
for current U.S. policies regarding the arrest, detention and trial of suspected foreign terrorists.

5

The historical records do not indicate an official name for this program so for convenience I use the descriptive
title: “U.S. Latin American Detention Program.”
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I.

Frederich Nottebohm’s Story
Frederich Nottebohm was born in Hamburg, Germany on September 16, 1881 into a

family of eight children. 6 After spending two years in South Africa as a young man, he
emigrated to Guatemala in 1905 at the age of 24. 7 Shortly thereafter, he entered into business
with his brothers, Arturo and Juan, in Guatemala City in a firm called Nottebohm Hermanos. 8
Nottebohm Hermanos was a very successful firm engaged in commerce and banking and which
owned several coffee plantations in Guatemala. 9 In fact, by the 1930s, Nottebohm Hermanos
was the second largest coffee producer in Guatemala. 10 The Nottebohm family had many other
business interests in multiple countries and was considered one of the oldest, wealthiest, and
most influential families in Guatemala and Central America. 11 Frederich became a partner in the
firm in 1912 and later became head of the firm in 1937, upon the death of his brother, Arturo. 12
The Nottebohm family and business interests first fell under suspicion for ties to
Germany during World War I. The U.S. government, through the office of the Alien Property
Custodian, declared Nottebohm Hermanos to be an alien enemy under the Trading with the
Enemy Act (TWEA) 13 and seized all property of Nottebohm Hermanos in the United States. 14
The United States government believed that Nottebohm Hermanos was owned at least in part by
6

Id. at 13. Depending on whether the German, Spanish or English spelling of his name is used, Mr. Nottebohm’s
first name may appear as Friedrich, Frederico or Frederich.
7
“Memorandum for the Chief of the Review Section: Frederico Wilheim Nottebohm” (Apr. 22, 1944), Box 758,
DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD.
8
Nottebohm, supra note 2. Juan Nottebohm is also known as Johannes Nottebohm.
9
Id.; see also “Memorandum for the Chief of the Review Section: Frederico Wilheim Nottebohm,” (Apr. 22, 1944),
Box 758, DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD.
10
David McGreery, RURAL GUATEMALA 1760-1940 234 (1994).
11
See “Memorandum for the Chief of the Review Section: Karl Heinz Nottebohm” (Apr. 30, 1944), Box 716, DOJ
Alien Enemy Case Files, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD.
12
Nottebohm, supra note 2. Arturo’s son, Karl Heinz Nottebohm, who had been born in Guatemala, also became a
junior partner in the firm at this time. Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in Guatemala, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE 3 (Dec.
27, 1945) at 3; see also “Memorandum re Citizenship Status of Karl Heinz Nottebohm” (Oct. 17, 1949), Thomas
Corcoran Papers, Box 505, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
13
50 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2006).
14
See Nottebohm Hermanos v. McGrath and Clark, Civil Action 1509-50 (D.D.C.), Answer and Counterclaim, in
Thomas Corcoran papers, Box 505, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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German nationals, who were deemed to be enemy aliens. 15 Following the war, the Nottebohms
were able to demonstrate to the U.S. government that only long-term residents of Guatemala had
any interest in Nottebohm Hermanos and that the company was not an enemy or ally of an
enemy within the meaning of the TWEA. 16 Accordingly, the U.S. government released and
returned the property to Nottebohm Hermanos pursuant to the settlement of the lawsuit brought
following the war. 17
Between 1905 and 1939, Frederich Nottebohm occasionally returned to Germany or
visited other countries for business or vacation, but he continued to have his permanent residence
in Guatemala. 18 One of the other countries he visited during this time was Liechtenstein, where
another brother, Dr. Hermann Nottebohm, had resided since 1931. 19
In 1938, Guatemala passed a new law which allowed persons born in Guatemala of
German parents to renounce Germany and obtain Guatemalan citizenship. 20 Frederich’s
nephews and junior business partners, Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm, took advantage of this

15

Id.
Id. The U.S. government later contested these representations, contending that Johannes Nottebohm, a resident
and citizen of Germany, and Nottebohm & Co. of Hamburg Germany, held ownership interests in Nottebohm
Hermanos at the relevant time. The government relied on these contested facts to resist return of the Nottebohms’
property after World War II. Answer and Counterclaim in Civil Action No. 1509-50, Thomas Corcoran Papers, Box
505, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. As described in more detail below, the parties
ultimately reached a settlement of the matter in 1958.
17
Agreement dated December 21, 1950, in Thomas Corcoran papers, Box 505, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.
18
J. Mervyn Jones, The Nottebohm Case, 5 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 230, 231 (Apr. 1956).
19
See id.; see also Nottebohm, supra note 2 at 8; Dr. Erwin Loewenfeld, Nationality and the Right of Protection in
International Law, 42 TRANSACTIONS OF A GROTIUS SOCIETY, PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INT’L L.:
TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 1956, 5, 6 (1956).
20
Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in Guatemala, supra note 12.
16
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law to become Guatemalan citizens, 21 but because Frederich had been born in Germany, he
remained ineligible for Guatemalan citizenship. 22
Perhaps sensing the coming of the war, in March of 1939, Frederich Nottebohm
conferred a power of attorney on the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos and left Guatemala for
Hamburg, Germany. 23 While Frederich was traveling in Europe, World War II officially began
with Germany’s invasion of Poland. 24 Shortly thereafter, Frederich traveled to Vaduz,
Liechtenstein to visit his brother, Dr. Hermann Nottebohm, and to apply for Liechtenstein
citizenship.25 Nottebohm’s citizenship application was quickly approved and on October 20,
1939, he received a certificate of naturalization as a Liechtenstein citizen. 26 Under both German
and Liechtenstein law, Nottebohm lost his German citizenship by virtue of becoming a citizen of
Liechtenstein. 27
Nottebohm then made preparations to return to Guatemala, including having the
Guatemalan Consul General in Switzerland enter a visa in his new Liechtenstein passport. 28
Upon his return to Guatemala in early 1939, Nottebohm informed the Guatemalan authorities of
his acquiring Liechtenstein citizenship and asked that the Guatemalan register of foreign
21

See Petition for Habeas Corpus filed in U.S. ex rel. Kurt Nottebohm v. W. S. Cook (U.S. Dist Ct. ND, Dec. 20,
1945), Box 540, DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, “Nottebohm, Kurt,” RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD;
see also Stephen Fox, AMERICA’S INVISIBLE GULAG: A BIOGRAPHY OF GERMAN-AMERICAN INTERNMENT &
EXCLUSION IN WORLD WAR II 105 (2000) (discussing Kurt Nottebohm’s Guatemalan birth and renunciation of
German citizenship).
22
Guatemalan citizenship laws appear to have been amended several times in the inter-war period, such that there
may have been a brief period of time when Frederich Nottebohm may have been eligible to apply for Guatemalan
citizenship. However, he never did so. Regardless, by government decree in the 1940s, Guatemala decided not to
recognize any changes in citizenship after 1938. See L.F.E. Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 Int’l & Comp. L Q. 1251,
1271 (1963); Loewenfeld, supra note 19 at 7.
23
Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 13.
24
Invasion of Poland: German Attack Across All Frontiers, THE TIMES (Sept. 2, 1939), available at
http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/viewArticle.arc?articleId=ARCHIVE-The_Times-1939-09-02-10001&pageId=ARCHIVE-The_Times-1939-09-02-10
25
Nottebohm, supra note 2 at 15. Frederich Nottebohm filed his Liechtenstein citizenship application on October 9,
1939. See Goldie, supra note 22 at 1269 (1963); Jones, supra note 18.
26
Nottebohm, supra note 2 at 15; Jones, supra, note 18 at 232.
27
See Loewenfeld, supra note 19 at 12; Goldie, supra note 22, at 1269.
28
Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 16-17; Jones, supra, note 18 at 232.
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nationals be changed to reflect this fact. 29 The Guatemalan authorities complied with this
request on February 5, 1940. 30 Frederich Nottebohm then resumed his business activities in
Guatemala. 31
Meanwhile, the Allied powers were becoming concerned about opening a “fifth column”
for Nazi Germany in Latin America fueled by Germans living in Latin America, but remaining
sympathetic to Germany. 32 The United States, in particular, worried about the prospect of Nazi
sympathizers so close to home. Thus, despite the fact that the U.S. had not yet officially entered
the war, the Americans joined the British in taking measures to sever any financial assistance to
Germany, including the blacklisting of companies and persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States who did business with Germany. 33 The United States froze the assets of these
firms and individuals so they could not provide any resources that might fuel the German war
machine.
As part of this effort, on November 1, 1939, England added Nottebohm Hermanos to a
roster of blacklisted companies. 34 In May 1941, the New York Times published an article which
called a purchase of land in El Salvador by the Nottebohm Trading Company a “Nazi
purchase.” 35 On July 17, 1941, U.S. President Roosevelt issued a Proclamation creating a
“Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals” consisting of “certain persons deemed to be, or
to have been acting or purporting to act, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of or under the

29

See Jones, supra, note 18 at 232.
Nottebohm, supra note 2 at Annex No. 1 of Application to ICJ, p. 12; see also Jones, supra note 18 at 232.
31
Jones, supra note 18 at 232.
32
Max Paul Friedman, NAZIS AND GOOD NEIGHBORS: THE UNITED STATES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GERMANS OF
LATIN AMERICA IN WORLD WAR II 2, 52 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). The term ‘fifth column” derives from a
comment by General Emilio Mola during the Spanish Civil War and refers to persons living within a community
rising up to fight. See id. at 2. See also Fox, supra note 21 at 7-8.
33
Presidential Proclamation 2497, 6 Fed. Reg. 3555 (July 19, 1941).
34
82 Concerns Added to Trade Blacklist, NEW YORK TIMES 24 (Nov. 18, 1939).
35
Questions Nazi Purchase, NEW YORK TIMES 31 (May 11, 1941).
30
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direction of, . . . or in collaboration with Germany or Italy or a national thereof.” 36 Nottebohm
Trading Co. of Salvador, along with two Nottebohm companies in Guatemala, Nottebohm
Hermanos and Nottebohm & Co., were included on that “Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked
Nationals.” 37
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States officially entered World
War II in December 1941. 38 Guatemala also entered the war against Germany on December 11,
1941. 39 On December 8, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Orders pursuant to the
Alien Enemy Act (AEA), 40 declaring all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Germany who
are over the age of 14 to be alien enemies and proscribing rules of conduct for such persons
found within the jurisdiction of the United States. 41
In 1942, the U.S. government added Frederich and his nephews and business partners,
Karl-Heinz and Kurt Nottebohm, to the U.S. blacklist, 42 along with several more Nottebohm
family businesses, including the Nottebohm Banking Corporation. 43 Much of the Nottebohms’
collective property located in the United States was later deemed to be vested in the U.S.
government, meaning that it could be held, used, administered, liquidated or sold for the benefit
of the United States. 44
In December 1942, both Karl-Heinz and Kurt Nottebohm were arrested in Guatemala as
alien enemies despite the fact that they had been born in Guatemala and were Guatemalan
36

Presidential Proclamation Authorizing a Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals and Controlling Certain
Exports, 6 Fed. Reg. 3555 (Jul. 19, 1941).
37
6 Fed. Reg. 3555, 3568 (Jul. 19, 1941).
38
Congressional Declaration of War on Japan, 55 Stat. pt. I, p. 795 (Dec. 8, 1941).
39
See id.; see also Loewenfeld, supra note 19 at 7 (Guatemala entered war at end of 1941).
40
50 U.S.C. § 21.
41
Presidential Proclamation No. 2526 (Dec. 8, 1941).
42
7 Fed. Reg. 2413, 2442 (Mar. 31, 1942) (Kurt); 7 Fed. Reg. 3275, 3295 (May 5, 1942) (Frederich and Karl
Heinz).
43
7 Fed. Reg. 837, 875 (Feb. 10, 1942); see also Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in Guatemala, supra note 12.
44
See, e.g., 11 Fed. Reg. 3023, 3043 (Mar. 22, 1946); Vesting Order No. 10185, 13 Fed. Reg. 1, 13 (Jan. 1, 1948).
However, as explained in more detail below, some property was eventually returned to the Nottebohm family.
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citizens. 45 In January 1943, U.S. military police in Guatemala City took them into custody and
removed them to the United States. 46 The U.S. government initially placed them in an
internment camp called Camp Kenedy in Texas and later transferred them to Fort Lincoln in
North Dakota. 47
Some months later, on October 19, 1943, the Guatemalan police requested that Frederich
Nottebohm appear before the Director of Police. 48 When he complied, he was informed that he
and several other persons were to be deported to the United States and interned in a camp there. 49
Frederich protested that he was no longer a German citizen and showed the Guatemalan police
his Liechtenstein passport. 50 He was told that he would be deported regardless of his
Liechtenstein nationality. 51 The Swiss embassy, on behalf of Liechtenstein, also protested his
deportation to and detention in the United States, but to no avail. 52

45

Petition for Habeas Corpus filed in U.S. ex rel. Kurt Nottebohm v. W. S. Cook (U.S. Dist Ct. ND, Dec. 20, 1945),
Box 540, DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, “Nottebohm, Kurt,” RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD; Letter
from Karl Heinz Nottebohm to Edward J. Ennis, Director, Alien Enemy Control Unit, dated May 5, 1944, Box 716,
DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD; see also Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in
Guatemala, supra note 12.
46
Carl Wiegman, A Citizen Seeks to Free His Son Interned by U.S., CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE at 4 (Jan. 11, 1946).
47
See id.
48
See Jones, supra note 18 at 232. Although this author uses the date of Nov. 19, he probably means Oct. 19, which
is the date listed in U.S. government records. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), Report of Alien Enemy, Nottebohm, Friedrich Wilhelm, Feb. 12, 1946, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special War
Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder: “Nottebohm,
Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD. See also Goldie, supra note 22, at 1269; Loewenfeld,
supra note 19 at 7.
49
See Jones, supra note 18 at 232.
50
See id.
51
See id.
52
Letter from Robert Fischer, Swiss Consul, Consulate de Suisse, Guatemala, to the American Ambassador at the
Embassy of the United States of America, Guatemala dated Oct. 20, 1943, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special War
Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder: “Nottebohm,
Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD. The U.S. government replied to the Swiss Consul’s
inquiry in March 1944, stating that while it was aware that Frederich Nottebohm had attempted to change his
nationality to that of Liechtenstein, it questioned the authenticity of his Liechtenstein citizenship. U.S. Dept. of
State Memorandum to the Swiss Legation, dated Mar. 28, 1944, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special War Problems Div.,
1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder: “Nottebohm, Frederico,” RG 59,
National Archives, College Park, MD. After further investigation, however, the U.S. government later came to the
conclusion that Mr. Nottebohm’s adoption of Liechtenstein citizenship was bona fide. Memorandum from J.
Bingham, Chief, Alien Enemy Control Section, to Mr. Monsma, dated Jan. 10, 1946, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special
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Frederich Nottebohm was taken to a United States military camp in Guatemala City and,
shortly thereafter, was placed on a U.S. ship and deported to the United States. 53 He was
interned at Camp Kenedy in Texas for approximately one year along with his nephews. 54 In
December 1943, all three of the Nottebohms at Camp Kenedy were given the opportunity to be
repatriated to Germany, but they refused repatriation because they preferred to return to
Guatemala. 55 In July 1944, a civil alien enemy hearing board stated its opinion that Karl
Nottebohm
has engaged in no political activities detrimental to the best interests of the
hemisphere, and that he cannot be considered a security subject for political
reasons. It appears that the only reason for keeping him in internment is the
contention of the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala and the U.S. State Department that
his release would be detrimental to the economic policy of the United States in
Central America. 56
Despite the board’s recommendations, Karl Nottebohm was not immediately released. In
September 1944, the U.S. government closed Camp Kenedy. 57 As a result, the Nottebohms were

War Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder:
“Nottebohm, Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD.
53
See Jones, supra note 18 at 232.
54
See id. Interestingly, the Warrant from the U.S. Attorney General authorizing Federich Nottebohm’s detention as
“a person [deemed] to be dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United Nations” was not issued until Nov.
13, 1943, long after Mr. Nottebohm’s detention began. See Warrant to the Commissioner of the INS issued by
Francis Biddle, Attorney General and dated Nov. 13, 1943, Box 758, DOJ, RG 60, National Archives, College Park,
MD (NA).
55
Letter to W.F. Kelly, Ass’t Comm’r for Alien Control, INS, from I. Williams, Officer in Charge, Alien Internment
Camp, Kenedy, TX, dated Dec. 23, 1943, Dept. of State, Special War Problems Div., RG 59, National Archives,
College Park, MD. The Nottebohms were luckier in this regard than Maher Arar, a dual Canadian and Syrian
citizen who was arrested while transiting through New York in 2002 and removed to Syria for interrogation despite
the fact that he claimed he would be tortured there. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 589 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court
dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under either the Torture Victims Protection Act or the Fifth
Amendment and the Court refused to extend a Bivens action to a case of extraordinary rendition, in essence
deferring to the political branches of government for reasons of foreign policy and national security. See id.
56
Alien Enemy Unit Recommendation, “Karl Nottebohm,” dated July 7, 1944, Box 716, DOJ Alien Enemy Case
Files, “Nottebohm, Karl-Heinz,” RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD (NA).
57
See German American Internee Coalition website: USDOJ Internment Facilities (stating that Camp Kenedy
closed in September 1944).
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transferred to Fort Lincoln in North Dakota, where the Nottebohms remained until their release
following the end of the war. 58
In 1944, while the Nottebohms were detained in the United States, the government of
Guatemala brought 57 sequestration hearings against Frederich Nottebohm as an enemy alien. 59
On December 20, 1944, the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry cancelled his registration as a national
of Liechtenstein. 60
World War II came to an end in May 1945. 61 Karl-Heinz Nottebohm was released in
December 1945 and allowed to return to Guatemala. 62 The government of Guatemala also
requested that the United States release Kurt Nottebohm. 63 On January 10, 1946, U.S. District
Court Judge Vogel ordered the U.S. government to release Kurt Nottebohm. 64 The U.S.
government complied, only to immediately charge Kurt Nottebohm with unlawful presence in
the United States in violation of the immigration laws. 65 They gave him 90 days to return to
Guatemala.
After two years and three months in detention, the U.S. government released Frederich
Nottebohm from Fort Lincoln in North Dakota on January 22, 1946. 66 The government
concluded that it had no credible evidence of Nazi sympathies or activities by Frederich
58

See Jones, supra note 18 at 233.
Loewenfeld, supra note 19 at 7. Sequestration is the process by which the government takes into custody the
property of a person until a legal matter is resolved. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1225 (5th ed. 1979).
60
Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 19.
61
Although Germany had been defeated and occupied since May 8, 1945, hostilities in World War II were not
officially terminated until December 31, 1946. See Presidential Proclamation No. 2714, 12 Fed. Reg. 1947 (Jan. 1,
1947).
62
Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in Guatemala, supra note 12 at 3.
63
Carl Wiegman, supra note 46 at 4.
64
See id.
65
Id.; see also Edward J. Ennis, Director Alien Enemy Control Unit, Telegram to Honorable Powless W. Lanier,
U.S. Attorney, dated Jan. 5, 1946, instructing Lanier to obtain release of Kurt Nottebohm, Box 540, DOJ Alien
Enemy Case Files, “Nottebohm, Kurt,” RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD.
66
Frederich Nottebohm was ordered released on January 15, 1946. See Letter from Jonathan B. Bingham, Chief,
Alien Enemy Control Section, to Ugo Carusi, Comm’r of INS, dated Jan. 15, 1946, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special
War Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder:
“Nottebohm, Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD.
59
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Nottebohm. A December 1945 Memorandum from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala states that
“Nottebohm’s name does not appear on the Nazi party list believed to be authentic, and there is
no reliable evidence to indicate that he was a member of the party or even a sympathizer of
Hitler.” 67 The U.S. government’s main evidence against Frederich Nottebohm was a purported
copy of a letter allegedly written by him that expressed a desire to “fight for the greatness of
Germany and its cause.” 68 For a variety of reasons, the U.S. government expressed “grave
doubt” as to the authenticity of the letter. 69 Accordingly, the U.S. government ultimately
recommended and arranged for his release.
Upon his release, Frederich traveled to New Orleans and applied for permission to return
to Guatemala. Guatemala refused to readmit him. 70 Frederich appealed the Guatemalan Foreign
Ministry’s decision to cancel his registration as a citizen of Liechtenstein, but was
unsuccessful. 71 Since he could not return to Guatemala, Frederich traveled to Liechtenstein and
made his home there instead.
In 1949, Guatemala passed Decree Law No. 689 which retrospectively fixed the date of
October 7, 1938 as the date on which enemy alien status should be determined. 72 In other words,
a person’s nationality as of October 1938 would remain that person’s nationality throughout
World War II regardless of any actions to change it. Because Frederich Nottebohm was still a
German national on that date, his attempt to change his nationality to that of Liechtenstein in
67
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1939 was invalid in the view of the Guatemalan government and he was still considered a
German national. Accordingly, the Guatemalan government took the official position that it was
entitled to expropriate all of Frederich Nottebohm’s property in Guatemala without
compensation because he was an enemy alien. 73
In April 1950, Nottebohm Hermanos commenced a civil action against the United States
government seeking return of its property that had been frozen in the United States during
WWII. 74 In that lawsuit, the U.S. government asserted that German interests existed in
Nottebohm Hermanos during the World Wars contrary to the claims of the Nottebohm family. 75
The U.S. government claimed Johannes Nottebohm, a citizen and resident of Germany, was also
a partner, as well as Nottebohm & Co., a firm in Hamburg Germany, and that the Nottebohms
had misrepresented these facts to the U.S. government following World War I in an attempt to
persuade the government to unblock property seized during that war. 76 Because of these alleged
misrepresentations, the U.S. government claimed it was entitled to keep the Nottebohm’s
property seized during WWII.
The Nottebohms and the U.S. government began a series of negotiations that resulted in
an agreement to unblock the Nottebohm’s assets. Pursuant to a Release Agreement dated
December 21, 1950, the U.S. government entered into a settlement with the Nottebohms and
released the claims of the United States against them. 77 The anticipated settlement would
provide an amount of money that represented approximately half the value of Nottebohm
73
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Hermanos’ property that had been seized. However, much of the property was not actually
released until 1958. 78
Frederich Nottebohm also persuaded the Liechtenstein government to take up his quest to
return to Guatemala and reclaim his property. On December 17, 1951, Liechtenstein filed an
application against Guatemala with the International Court of Justice alleging that Guatemala
had wrongfully refused to recognize its grant of citizenship to Frederich Nottebohm. 79
Unfortunately for Nottebohm, the ICJ ruled that he did not have sufficient genuine links with
Liechtenstein such that Guatemala had to honor the Liechtenstein grant of citizenship. 80 This
decision was highly criticized by international scholars 81 and its reasoning was later rejected by
the International Law Commission in its Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 82
Following the ICJ’s decision, the Guatemalan Congress voted on November 23, 1956 to
expropriate all German property without compensation. 83 The Guatemalan government, led by
Carlos Castillo Armas, determined that virtually all German property confiscated during World
War II would be registered permanently as state property to pay for Guatemala’s “war
damages.” 84 As a result, Frederich Nottebohm was stripped of all of his property in Guatemala
and received no compensation for his loss. 85
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II.

A Tragedy of Justice: The Creation of the Latin American Detention Program
Frederich Nottebohm was arrested, forcibly removed to the United States, interned for

over two years, and stripped of his Guatemalan property (as well as some of his assets in the
U.S.), without due process of law. The U.S. government never held a hearing at which Frederich
was proved to be a German citizen or a threat to the national security of the United States. U.S.
law at the time authorized the President to apprehend and restrain persons found in the United
States who are natives or citizens of a hostile nation during war time. 86 The law did not require
any showing of dangerousness in word or deed. Simply being a national or citizen of an enemy
country by accident of birth or family was sufficient. As one Immigration and Nationalization
Service (“INS”) official involved in the program stated, “the war thrust us into the shameful
position of locking people up for their beliefs.” 87
Unfortunately, Nottebohm’s story is not unique. Over 4,000 persons of German
nationality or ancestry living in Latin America during World War II were treated in the same
way. 88 For example, in the Panama Canal Zone, the Panamanian government and U.S. military
officials routinely cooperated to intern Axis nationals “without any inquiry as to the loyalty or
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danger of the particular alien.” 89 According to historian Max Friedman, “only a minority of the
deportees conceivably warranted the label of “dangerous enemy alien.” 90 “With only eight of the
4,058 German deportees even allegedly involved in espionage, and the record of sabotage
“practically nil” according to the FBI, spying and sabotage were red herrings as far as the
internments were concerned.” 91 Thus, the counterespionage work of Allied intelligence did not
result in a high positive rate of identification and internment of truly dangerous enemy aliens.
The historical record reveals three quite different reasons for the United States’
development and operation of the Latin American Detention Program during WWII. The first
justification provided for the Program was national security. As noted above, the United States
was concerned about the possibility of German subversives operating in its own backyard and
was not confident that the Latin American governments were able or willing to sufficiently
contain this threat. 92 Second, the United States wanted to build up a reserve of German internees
who could be traded for American prisoners of war. 93 Third, the United States hoped to eliminate
German commercial interests in Latin America in part to make room for U.S. business interests
to move in after the war. 94 Whether or not a person posed any security risk to the United States
was largely irrelevant to these latter two goals.
Historian Max Friedman explains the United States’ motivation to create the program as
follows: “The U.S. view[ed] Latin America as a vulnerable, dependent region where latinos [sic]
89
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are helpless and foreigners are the real actors.” 95 The United States believed that the quality of
the intelligence operation that was supposed to find subversives to the south was poor; thus, it
could not accurately assess the extent of the threat or the ability of the Latin American
governments to deal with it. 96 Further, “Germans living in Latin America . . . were making
inroads into Latin American markets. . . . As with the fear of military invasion, U.S. officials
believed the German economic offensive depended on the collaboration of Germans residing in
Latin America. . . . German competition was a security issue.” 97 Friedman summarizes the
United States’ varying motivations as follows:
The removal of Latin America’s Germans evolved rapidly out of three related
currents of policy. The first was the endeavor by the U.S. government to identify
and neutralize dangerous Axis nationals in Latin America. . . . U.S. officials had
no confidence that Latin American governments were able to discipline their own
Axis nationals and believed that local internment would be inadequate.
Dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of local controls would provide a rationale
for transferring the aliens to United States custody. The second current flowed
from the desire of the United States to destroy German power and of some of the
Latin American leaders to turn the anti-Axis campaign into political or financial
gain. . . . The third current emanated from a traditional wartime practice under
which belligerents agree to repatriate enemy diplomats and bring their own
diplomats home. 98
Each of these three motivations is explained in more detail below.
A. National Security
Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S.
Ambassador to Panama, Edward Wilson, became concerned that the Panama Canal might be the
object of a similar attack. 99 Accordingly, the United States requested that Panama detain and
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intern enemy aliens within Panama. 100 The United States effectuated similar roundups in several
other Latin American countries, including Guatemala. 101 President Ubico of Guatemala asked
the U.S. Legation if it would assist him in expelling all Nazis of military age from his country,
which the United States did. 102
The Roosevelt Administration perceived a possibility of Germans living in Latin America
becoming a destabilizing force and presenting a “fifth column” for Nazi Germany. 103 “[T]he
Roosevelt administration assumed Hitler might use the Auslandsdeutsche (Germans living
abroad) to pave the way for a German invasion of the Americas.” 104
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle “was the main force behind the [Latin
American] deportation program.” 105 He supported the program primarily because he viewed
Germans in Latin America as an external threat to the United States. 106 However, actual proof
of subversive activities was not required. A U.S. State Department memorandum from
November 1942 insisted that it was not necessary to distinguish between dangerous and nondangerous enemy aliens because their national identity alone was sufficient evidence of their
collective guilt. 107
Both Guatemala and the United States “misconstrued expressions of group solidarity and
ethnic and national pride among the Germans of Latin America as a sign of their willingness to
collaborate in war.” 108 In 1941, it was conventional wisdom that “Germans living in Latin
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America [were] the key to Nazi aspirations for dominating the region by military, political, or
economic means.” 109 In 1942, the U.S. State Department declared that in Latin America, “all
German nationals without exception. . . are all dangerous and should be removed from their
present sphere of activity as rapidly as possible.” 110
Many U.S. officials, including intelligence agents, ambassadors, and cabinet members,
failed to understand Latin America and Latin Americans; they failed to speak the language and
held many stereotypes and prejudices. 111 The media depicted Latin Americans as “inferior and
childlike, feminized and vulnerable.” 112 Yellow journalism “contributed directly to the
impressions held by policymakers in Washington.” 113 The British also contributed to the
misinformation regarding the Nazi menace in Latin America in order to persuade the U.S.
government of the urgency of the threat posed by Germany and to try to bring the United States
into the war. 114
In retrospect, however, there was little solid evidence that many of these individuals
presented any real danger. 115 Postwar reports often lacked charges or reasons as to why certain
individuals had been rounded up. 116 In fact, some of those arrested and interned were Jews who
had themselves fled from the Nazis. 117
The contention that all Germans were dangerous is refuted by the United States’ own
experience with the more than 300,000 Germans living within its own borders and its decision to
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intern less than 1% of them. 118 If Germans were dangerous by virtue of their nationality alone, it
would have made more sense to detain those already living in the United States in far greater
numbers than to import Germans from Latin America for detention.
B. Bargaining Chips
A second reason the U.S. government brought Germans from Latin America to the
United States for detention was a concern for American prisoners of war in Germany. Having
Germans in custody opened the door for the possibility of prisoner exchanges and the
repatriation of American POWs.119 In addition, it was hoped that Germans would treat
American prisoners of war better if they knew that whatever treatment they provided would be
reciprocated by the United States with respect to Germans in U.S. custody.
On December 16, 1941, John Moores Cabot, the Central America desk officer in the
State Department summed up the arguments in favor of a regional program to intern Germans in
the United States as follows:
“I feel that it is wise to clear as many young Nazis out of Central America as
possible, because (1) it will definitely diminish the danger of subversive activities
in Central America and the indirect threat they represent to the Canal, (2) it will
give us hostages who will serve as a brake on any measures taken against our
citizens in enemy-occupied territory, (3) it will please the governments of
countries which are anxious to get rid of the Axis nationals, and it will be
considered by them an act of practical cooperation, (4) it may serve as an
inspiration for other countries which seriously fear subversive activities, (5) it will
build up a vested interest in Germany’s defeat in the countries concerned,
particularly if any property is seized, . . . While I do not think we should urge any
government to deport Axis nationals, I see no harm in discreetly pushing the
matter when an opening is given.” 120
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Thus, German citizens could be used as bargaining chips both to obtain the release of American
POWs and to secure their decent treatment while in German captivity.
C. Commercial Gains
What began as a deportation program driven by national security concerns evolved over time
“to focus increasingly upon individuals who could in no way be tied to Nazi activity, but had
acquired significant economic positions.” 121 It appears that economic issues gradually replaced
security concerns near the midpoint of the deportation program. The United States was very
interested in post-war U.S. dominance in Latin American markets, which is demonstrated by
U.S. reluctance to return German detainees to Latin America following the war. 122 Instead, some
U.S. officials advocated for repatriation to Germany for the sake of “our long-range economic
and political interests.” 123
Reactions from the Latin American countries were mixed. Some requested that the many
detainees with family members in Latin America be returned home and reunited with their
families. 124 Other Latin American leaders realized that “seizing the property of their German
neighbors could be greatly simplified by calling them Nazis and handing them over to the United
States” and not allowing them to return. 125
The targeting of the Nottebohms for economic rather than political activities “vividly
illustrates the way the deportation program had evolved during the war from an undertaking
primarily motivated by the need to ensure security against subversion into a long-term project of
permanently weakening German economic competition in a region long claimed as ‘America’s
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backyard.’” 126 Thus, while the United States was initially concerned with national security,
economic concerns eventually became paramount. By way of example, in 1943, Albert
Clattenburg, Assistant Chief of Breckinridge Long’s Special Division, completed a report after
touring several U.S. internment camps, in which he discussed the original purpose of the
program: “Our transfer of these enemy aliens to this country for internment is based on our
sincere desire to extirpate the carefully-prepared organizations of the Axis governments in the
other American republics and thus to ensure the political security of this hemisphere.” 127 He
then concluded, however, that the program was corrupted by Latin American leaders who
wanted to get rid of persons who were likely to foment internal opposition or in order to seize the
business and property of the deported Axis nationals. 128
With respect to the Nottebohm family in particular, there is evidence in the files of the
State Department on Karl and Kurt Nottebohm that these individuals were deemed not to be
dangerous and that their removal from Guatemala was largely motivated by economic concerns.
For example, one Department of Justice memorandum concerning the Nottebohm family
acknowledges that there was no evidence they had been engaged in any political activities and
that there was even some evidence that they were “actually anti-Nazi.” 129 The memorandum’s
author, James Bell, further wrote that he did not support continued internment of the Nottebohms
“because I believe that the economic end, the breaking up of economic power of certain Germans
in Central America, has been served by the deportations of the subjects from Central
America.” 130 Likewise, Kurt Nottebohm alleged in a petition for habeas corpus for release from
126
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detention that when he inquired of the U.S. government as to why he was being detained, he was
told: “We have investigated your record and found nothing against you, but you must realize this
is also a commercial war.” 131 Thus, Karl and Kurt Nottebohm, both Guatemalan citizens, and
Frederich, a Liechtenstein citizen, appear to have been detained for economic reasons far more
than because of any security issues.
D. Expressions of Concern
Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Breckinridge Long was the most senior official at the
U.S. State Department in charge of overseeing the deportation and repatriation of Germans from
Latin America. 132 “He and his like-minded subordinates in the Special Division helped bring
Jews and other non-Nazis into the camps and ensured that they would not receive hearings or be
otherwise enabled to argue their case” for release. 133 The State Department was not in charge of
the camps, however. That duty fell to the Department of Justice (DOJ). 134
The DOJ lawyers made a greater attempt to discriminate between dangerous and nondangerous Germans than did the State Department officials. The person in charge on the Justice
side was Edward Eniss, the head of DOJ’s Alien Enemy Control Unit (AECU). 135 He opposed
mass internment on principle, and with U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle’s support, he tried
to moderate the excesses of the program. 136 “Ennis found a sympathetic listener in James H.
Keeley, Jr., the acting chief of the State Department’s Special Division, who was beginning to
have some qualms of his own. Keeley had noted that enemy aliens in the United States received
131
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hearings, but those the State Department brought up from Latin America did not.” 137 Keeley
wrote in November 1942:
Whether the man be innocent or guilty of subversive activities inimical to the
safety of this hemisphere, it seems to me that he is entitled to have his case
reviewed somewhere, [s]omehow. . .The aliens received from other American
Republics have had scant, if any, hearings in the Republic from whence they
came, and . . .they are apparently condemned to remain interned here for the
duration of the war without the possibility of having the facts in their cases
reviewed here or in the Republic from whence they came. I don’t like it . . . It
isn’t in keeping with the principles of justice for which we are fighting. No one
wants to be soft as regards to a dangerous enemy alien, but we need not copy the
methods of our enemies by refusing to permit a man who claims to be innocent
somehow to arrange for a hearing of his case on the merits. . . To give such aliens
a hearing, or a rehearing in those cases where the semblance of a hearing may
have been given in the Republic that sent them here, should not endanger the
safety of the United States. 138
Keeley’s efforts to provide hearings were rebuffed by his State Department colleague,
Breckinridge Long, however. 139 But despite State’s resistance, many of the detainees did receive
administrative hearings, as described below.
III. Was the Program Legal?
A. United States Law
U.S. law at the time of World War II authorized the President during war time to
apprehend and restrain persons found in the United States who are natives or citizens of a hostile
nation. 140 The primary statutory authority relied upon by the United States in conducting the
Latin American Detention Program was the Alien Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21, which provides:
Whenever there is declared war between the United States and any foreign nation
or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted,
or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or
government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event, all
137
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natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being
of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States
and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured,
and removed as alien enemies. The President is authorized, in any such event, by
his proclamation thereof, or other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed,
on the part of the United States, toward the aliens who become so liable; the
manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject and in what
cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide
for the removal of those who, not being permitted to reside within the United
States, refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations
which are found necessary in the premises and for the public safety. 141
The Alien Enemy Act was originally passed in 1798 and has changed little since then. 142
Pursuant to this statutory authority, the President is given extremely broad discretion to arrest,
detain and remove “natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects” of a hostile nation found in the
United States. 143 The purpose of the Act is to subject to Executive control all aliens, who,
because of their nativity or feeling of allegiance, might be led to acts dangerous to the public
safety of the United States if permitted to remain at large.
The AEA was implemented with respect to persons from Latin America by way of a
series of Executive Orders. Execution of the program was assigned to a new governmental unit
called the AECU, in the DOJ. 144 The head of the DOJ, Attorney General Francis Biddle,
emphasized the need to conduct the program of investigation into enemy aliens as fairly as
possible, consistent with democratic principles. 145 To that end, civilian alien enemy review
boards were created to examine the evidence against an alien enemy and determine his or her
fate. 146
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Accused alien enemies had no right to a hearing before the Board, 147 but many hearings
were granted to allow an alien to present evidence on his or her behalf. A board was composed
of three or more persons who were usually prominent citizens in the community. 148 There was
no requirement that hearing board officers be lawyers or judges; although an attempt was made
to have at least one attorney on each Board. 149
Accused persons had no right to counsel, but could bring a friend along as an advisor. 150
By contrast, the government was represented by the United States District Attorney for that
particular judicial district (or his designee), along with a special agent from the FBI, and a
representative from the INS. 151
The FBI conducted the investigation of the alien and presented its evidence to the
Board. 152 The alien would be questioned about the evidence and could submit affidavits in his or
her behalf. 153 Aliens could bring only limited challenges to their detention, such as alleging that
they were not, in fact, of German nationality or were less than the statutory minimum of 14 years
of age. 154
The Board was empowered to recommend one of three outcomes: internment, parole, or
release. 155 The Board’s recommendation was forwarded to the AECU, where it was reviewed,
and forwarded to the Attorney General with a recommendation of the directors of the AECU. 156
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The U.S. District Attorney would also make his own independent recommendation. 157 If the
three recommendations were in agreement, the Attorney Generally normally concurred in their
recommendations. 158 If there was disagreement, the Attorney General tended to side with the
Board, which had actually observed the demeanor of the accused alien enemy. 159
One scholar who studied these Alien Enemy Review Boards concluded that:
While admittedly, the United States Constitution offers no protection to an enemy
alien during the time of war, the position of the United States Government during
World War II was that it did not want to sacrifice the substance of democracy
while men battled in foreign lands to preserve it. The procedural aspects of its
internment programme were designed to support this principle. 160
However, this scholar went on to describe the United States’ use of these review boards
as a “feeble gesture.” 161 They were informal tribunals with little or no applicable law to guide
them. If the U.S. government thought a Board member was too lenient in favor of aliens, the
Justice Department would remove the officer from the Board. 162 Accordingly, the boards were
forced to create and apply their own rules, acting as both judge and jury. 163
The constitutionality of the Alien Enemy Act was challenged in a number of lawsuits,
including Ludecke v. Watkins, a post-World War II suit that reached the U.S. Supreme Court. 164
The plaintiff, Mr. Ludecke, had been born in Germany and had once been a member of the Nazi
party. 165 However, he later disagreed with the Nazis and was imprisoned in a German
concentration camp. 166 He escaped in 1934 and traveled to the United States, where he became a
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lawful permanent resident. 167 His petition to become a U.S. citizen was denied in 1939,
however, and, in 1941, he was arrested as an alien enemy whom the Attorney General deemed to
be dangerous to the United States. 168 After unsuccessfully challenging his removal to Germany
in administrative hearings, Mr. Ludecke brought a habeas corpus petition in federal court
alleging that the Alien Enemy Act was unconstitutional.
By the time Mr. Ludecke’s case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, World War II had been
over for three years. Mr. Ludecke claimed that the statute did not authorize deportation of
enemy aliens after hostilities had ceased. In addition, Mr. Ludecke claimed that due process
required that the federal courts review the fairness of the administrative hearing at which he was
determined to be a dangerous enemy alien.
In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, stating
that, barring questions of interpretation and constitutionality, the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 is a
statute that precludes judicial review. 169 The Act “confers on the president very great
discretionary powers” and “the very nature of the President’s power to order the removal of all
enemy aliens rejects the notion that courts may pass judgment upon the exercise of his
discretion.” 170 Thus, the Court accepted a very narrow role for judicial review. 171
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On the merits, the Court held that “[w]ar does not cease with a cease-fire order, and
power to be exercised by the President such as that conferred by the Act of 1798 is a process
which begins when war is declared but is not exhausted when the shooting stops.” 172 The Court
further noted that it is often impracticable to deport an alien enemy during active hostilities. 173
Thus, the power to deport alien enemies continues beyond the end of the “declared war.”
As is evident from its text, the AEA does not require any showing of disloyalty in word
or deed. Simply being a native or citizen of an enemy country by accident of birth is
sufficient. 174 Interestingly, in Ludecke, the Supreme Court noted the fact that the statute did not
require a showing of dangerousness, but also noted that this potential deficiency was cured by
the President’s Proclamation requiring that only enemy aliens deemed dangerous by the Attorney
General shall be removed. 175 The Court assumed that the President and the Attorney General
would not act arbitrarily, but would imply a standard such as “dangerousness” in the exercise of
this power. 176 This assumption leaves open the question of the statute’s constitutionality if a
person is arrested, detained, and removed merely on the basis of nationality without any showing
of dangerousness. 177
Outside the wartime context, such treatment likely would be considered unlawful
discrimination based on race or nationality and a violation of due process. The Court spent little
time on the issue of any potential violation of Ludecke’s individual rights, however, simply
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declaring that the Act is not “offensive to some emanation of the Bill of Rights” including the
Due Process Clause. 178 The Court stated that if war powers are abused, recourse should be
sought in the political branches, not in court. 179
The Ludecke decision was a close one with four justices dissenting, both as to the
continuing application of the Act beyond the cessation of active hostilities and as to the ability of
the court to review the fairness of the administrative procedures to ensure due process. 180
According to Justice Douglas, the procedures used to find Ludecke a danger to the public “must
conform with the requirements of due process. And habeas corpus is the time-honored
procedure to put them to the test. . . . Due process does not perish when war comes.” 181
Unfortunately for Ludecke and the other German detainees, however, his was not the winning
argument.
The Court’s decision in Ludecke is consistent with its historical reluctance to question the
political branches of government in time of war. It also is consistent with the treatment of
foreign nationals in U.S. immigration law. 182 As a general rule, U.S. courts have declared that
the federal government has plenary power over immigration, in part because of its connection to
foreign affairs and national security issues. 183 As a result, courts have given the political
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branches significant discretion when it comes to defining the due process rights of noncitizens. 184
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex re. Mezei, a case arising shortly after World War II,
the United States denied admission to a former long-term lawful permanent resident of the
United States, who was returning from a trip abroad, on the basis of undisclosed national security
concerns. 185 Because Mezei had been been deemed a security risk by the United States, no other
country would accept him, despite his best efforts to find another home. As a result, Mezei was
stranded on Ellis Island indefinitely.
Mezei challenged his indefinite detention through a habeas corpus proceeding.
Upholding Mezei’s continued exclusion and detention, the Court stated: “Courts have long
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised
by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” 186 While
acknowledging that aliens physically present on U.S. territory, even if illegally, are entitled to
due process under the Constitution, the Court stated that Mezei was not entitled to due process
because he had not “entered” the United States as that term is understood in immigration law.
Accordingly, Mezei’s continued exclusion and detention did not infringe any constitutional
rights. 187
Nottebohm’s case is analogous to that of Mezei in that Nottebohm, like Mezei, was
detained on U.S. territory, but was never lawfully admitted to the United States. One main
difference, however, is that Nottebohm did not come to the United States voluntarily seeking
entry. Instead, he was brought here against his will by the U.S. government. Interestingly, the
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United States appears to have used immigration law as additional support for the detention of the
Latin Americans by charging those who were brought here with being illegally present. 188 The
decision to use immigration law may have been very intentional given the wide latitude courts
give to the political branches of government with respect to the treatment of non-U.S. citizens.
The Nottebohm case is unlike Mezei in another respect. While Mezei had no other
country willing to accept him leading to his potentially indefinite detention, the Nottebohms all
had other countries that were willing to take them in. Both Kurt and Karl-Heinz eventually
returned to Guatemala; Frederich went to Liechtenstein. Thus, the Nottebohm case is unlike
Mezei in that the Nottebohms were not asking the courts to allow them to enter the United
States. 189 Instead, they were simply asking to be released from detention. How these foreigners
might fare today is discussed in Part IV below.
B. International Law
International law as it existed during WWII also did not provide much assistance to the
German detainees from Latin America. There is strong support for the proposition that it is a
breach of international law for a State to send its agents into the territory of another State to
apprehend persons accused of a crime without that State’s consent. 190 However, the historical
record of the Latin American Detention Program shows that the United States and the Latin
American governments agreed to cooperate in the identification, arrest, and internment in other
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countries of persons suspected of being enemy aliens. Thus, the program described herein was
created with the full cooperation of all the involved governments, eliminating any concerns about
breaches of sovereignty. Some scholars and authors have argued, however, that the kidnapping
and mass deportations of civilians from Latin America to the United States violated international
humanitarian law that existed during WWII. 191 This next section will describe the creation and
execution of the program in light of then existing principles of international law.
1.

Pan American Union and the Committee for Political Defense

Cooperation between the United States and the other Latin American governments during
this time period was largely carried out under the auspices of the Pan American Union. The Pan
American Union was so named at the Fourth American Conference of American States in
Buenos Aires in 1910. Through this umbrella organization, the American governments created a
series of international agreements governing cooperation during war time and beyond. Pursuant
to these agreements, the Latin American governments identified persons who were German
nationals living in their countries, arrested them, and turned them over to U.S. authorities, who
brought them to the United States against their will to be detained in internment camps for the
duration of the war.
At the first meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics held in
Panama from September 23 to Oct. 3, 1939 following the outbreak of WWII, the governments
adopted a recommendation on the coordination of police and judicial measures to prevent and
repress unlawful activities that individuals may attempt in favor of foreign belligerent states. 192
At the second meeting of the governments of the American Republics in Habana, Cuba in July
1940, the governments agreed to convene an international conference to further coordinate their
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efforts with respect to police and judicial measures for the defense of society and the American
States. 193 The American governments further agreed to coordinate efforts “to eradicate from the
Americas the spread of doctrines that tend to place in jeopardy the common inter-American
democratic ideal.” 194 They proposed a variety of measures designed to tighten their defenses,
including proposals for precautionary measures in the granting of passports and the exercise of
vigilance over the entry of nationals of non-American States. 195
The Resolutions sought to defend the Americas against tactics practiced by the Nazis in
Europe that led to the fall of several European States such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and
Denmark. 196 In particular, the American Republics sought “to protect themselves against the
vanguard of the totalitarian attack – against the spy, saboteur, the propagandist, and the political
agent operating under cover of diplomatic immunity.” 197
The cornerstone of the political defense for the hemisphere was created at the Third
Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
in February 1942. 198 By that time, the United States had suffered the attack on Pearl Harbor and
many of the American Republics had officially entered the war against the Axis powers of
Germany, Italy and Japan.
At that Third Meeting, the governments recognized the need for ongoing and continuous
communication. Accordingly, they created the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee
for Political Defense (“CPD”) to study the problems relating to political defense of the Continent
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and to recommend appropriate measures. 199 Members of the CPD were named by the
Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the United States of America, Mexico, Uruguay, and
Venezuela, who were to represent the interests of all twenty-one American Republics. 200 The
Ministers of Foreign Affairs approved three overall policy directives to be followed by CPD in
carrying out its work. The second of these policy directives is most relevant here. It states:
“Adequate defense against our fully identified aggressors is possible only if it is openly
recognized that discriminatory measures must be taken against Axis nationals, since said
aggressors use their nationals in the Americas as their first line of political attack.” 201
The CPD held its first meeting on April 15, 1942. 202 During the course of its work, it
submitted twenty-one programs of action to the governments of the American Republics. 203 Its
work was organized into four primary areas: (1) control of dangerous aliens; (2) prevention of
the abuse of citizenship; (3) regulation of entry and exit of persons; and (4) prevention of acts of
political aggression, such as espionage, sabotage, and subversive propaganda. 204 The CPD
believed that peacetime legislation was insufficient to deal with the threat presented by “the Axis
pattern of total attack, predicated on an intense and world-wide campaign of political
aggression.” 205 Accordingly, its work took the form of resolutions that would provide the basis
of laws or decrees to be adopted by the governments in accordance with their own domestic legal
systems. 206
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The CPD first recommended a system of registration and periodic reporting for all aliens
as a method to help identify and control dangerous individuals. 207 Violations of the program
would be punishable by internment. 208 The CPD also recommended that: “The security of the
Hemisphere demands that all dangerous Axis nationals be totally deprived of their liberty of
movement and of their power to undermine our institutions.”209 Accordingly, the CPD adopted
Resolution XX, which recommends internment of dangerous Axis nationals within the
Hemisphere for the duration of the emergency. 210 Pursuant to Resolution XX, internment could
occur in well-guarded detention camps in non-vital areas of the country where the arrest
occurred. 211 Alternatively, some American Republics concluded bilateral agreements for the
expulsion and transfers of dangerous Axis agents and nationals to other Republics for interment
for the duration of the war. 212
Resolution XX also set forth a standard for “dangerousness.” According to the
Resolution, “a national of a member State of the Tripartite Pact or a State subservient thereto,
who by his present or past conduct, indicates a predisposition to aid a member State of the
Tripartite Pact, should be regarded as dangerous” and thus subject to detention. 213 There was no
requirement that a person actually engage in dangerous conduct, only that the person show a
propensity to do so. Conduct deemed to indicate a “predisposition” included: (A) affiliation or
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support of a group that acts in the interest of a member State of the Tripartite Pact; (B) conduct
giving sufficient grounds to believe that the person has or will engage in the illegal transmission
or collection of vital information about the defense of the Hemisphere; (C) conduct giving
sufficient grounds to believe that the person has or will commit acts of destruction or sabotage of
materials or facilities vital to the defense of the Hemisphere; (D) conduct giving sufficient
grounds to believe that the person has disseminated totalitarian propaganda or has incited others
to act in the interest of a member State of the Tripartite Pact; (E) adherence to the totalitarian
political ideology or pronounced sympathy therewith; (F) any other conduct indicating an
intention to prejudice the defense and security of any American Republic in the interest of a
member State of the Tripartite Pact. 214
Interestingly, the CPD acknowledged in its Explanatory Statement about Resolution XX
that these practices had already been followed by the American Republics. 215 Thus, it appears
that the arrest and detention practices predated the formal legal authority for same. In addition,
the CPD stated that in exercising its powers of detention and expulsion, the American Republics
“have wisely concluded that the Axis should not be permitted to take advantage of democratic
respect for traditional concepts of International Law. . . using as a protection for their
machinations the guarantees of the very democracy which they are seeking to destroy.” 216 On
the other hand, the CPD recommended that the American Republics utilize the Geneva
Convention of July 27, 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war as a general guide for

214

Id.
See Explanatory Statement to Resolution XX, Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis Nationals (May 21,
1943), reprinted in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense
77 (July 1943).
216
Id.
215

37

the detention of dangerous Axis agents to forestall any threats of mistreatment of Americans in
Axis territory. 217
In addition to Resolution XX on Detention and Expulsion, the CPD also adopted a
Resolution on the Prevention of Abuses of Nationality, which gave States like Guatemala
additional legal cover for their refusal to recognize any changes in citizenship by former German
nationals and expropriation of the property of such persons. 218 The United States and other Latin
American governments believed that internal security was threatened by a multitude of Axis
agents who were carrying on their subversive activities within the Western Hemisphere and were
acquiring American citizenship to cloak their activities. 219 Thus, they recommended measures
limiting the ability to acquire citizenship and providing for the loss of citizenship. 220
All of this cooperative activity under the umbrella of the Pan American Union provided
the legal basis for the United States to enter other Latin American countries, arrest accused alien
enemies on foreign soil in cooperation with local authorities, and bring those persons to the
United States for internment, as happened with the Nottebohms. However, these international
agreements did not address the human rights of those arrested and detained pursuant to the
program in part because little international human rights law existed at the time.
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2.

International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Treaties

With the exception of certain principles in the laws of war, most modern international
human rights norms which might have benefitted detainees such as the Nottebohms had not yet
developed at the time of World War II. The United Nations (UN) Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants of Civil and Political Rights and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the American Declaration of Human Rights,
were all written after the war. Thus, the detainees had very little international human rights law
to rely on during WWII.
One legal exception detainees could have possibly used was in the area of the laws of
war, also known as international humanitarian law. The modern-day Geneva Conventions III
and IV of 1949, which govern the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians during
armed hostilities, did not yet exist. Nevertheless, the Geneva Convention of 1929 set forth some
basic rules with respect to the treatment of POWs. 221 And while there were no comparable
treaties dealing with the alien enemy civilians interned in the territory of a belligerent nation, 222
as noted above, it was U.S. policy to treat detainees humanely in accordance with the 1929
Geneva Convention on POWs.
In addition to requiring that the detaining Power treat detainees humanely, the 1929
Geneva Convention set forth rules regarding trials and penal sanctions for POWs. Article 45
provides that POWs are subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in effect in the armed forces
of the detaining Power. 223 Article 61 provides for basic due process rights such as notice and
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opportunity to be heard. 224 Article 62 guarantees that the POW shall have the right to be assisted
by a qualified advocate of his own choice. If the POW does not make such a choice, the
Protecting Power may procure an advocate for the detainee. 225 Also of relevance here, Article 75
of the 1929 Geneva Convention provides that POWs shall be repatriated as soon as possible after
the conclusion of peace. 226 However, none of these guarantees are referred to in the cases and
materials relating to the alien enemy review board proceedings, suggesting that these due process
guarantees were not extended to civilian detainees in that context.
In addition to the 1929 Geneva Convention, a few customary rules of international
humanitarian law may have been applicable to the U.S. Latin-American Detention Program
during WWII. For example, at least one scholar, Professor Natsu Taylor Saito, has argued that
the prohibition on individual and mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected
persons (civilians) from occupied territory now found in Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention already existed in the form of customary international law during WWII. 227 He
further argues that these prohibitions were applicable to the arrests, detentions, and deportations
of Germans and Japanese from Latin America. 228
One problem with Professor Saito’s argument is that it assumes the individuals involved
were innocent civilians. It is likely that the U.S. and Latin American governments responsible
for these programs would have argued that they were only concerned with “dangerous enemy
aliens” in accordance with the CPD’s Resolutions, even if it was later discovered that there was
insufficient evidence of dangerousness in individual cases. In addition, these rules of
224
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international humanitarian law tend to be concerned with persons in an occupied territory, and
neither Latin America nor the United States was an occupied territory. Accordingly, some of the
customary international humanitarian law rules may not have been strictly applicable. And, as
illustrated by the Ludecke and Nottebohm decisions, both domestic and international courts were
extremely deferential to the political branches of government in wartime. Thus, it is likely that
the government would have won any legal challenges based on customary international law.
In retrospect, not enough investigation was done to determine whether the accused alien
enemies from Latin America were truly dangerous before removing them from their homes.
However, it is difficult to conclude that the U.S. Latin American Detention Program was clearly
illegal under international law existing at the time.
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IV. Would the Result Be Any Different Today?
The Alien Enemy Act remains in the statute books unchanged to this day. However, the
government has not relied upon the statute since World War II, most likely because the statute
applies in times of declared war and Congress has not officially declared war since WWII. If the
government were to invoke the AEA today as a basis for detaining enemy aliens, changes in U.S.
statutory and constitutional law and international human rights law strongly suggest that a
similar program today would not withstand judicial scrutiny. On the other hand, there are many
aspects of the current program to identify, arrest, detain, and try suspected terrorists or “unlawful
enemy combatants” that resemble the Latin American Detention program. Some of those aspects
are currently being litigated. As a result, the legal status remains unclear and it is difficult to
predict final outcomes. That said, there have been some changes in the law that require detainees
to be given more rights than they were in the 1940s. This next section describes how the law has
evolved and how detainees in the war on terror are or are not treated differently today as a result.
A.

U.S. Law
1.

Equal Protection and Due Process

Our understanding of the scope of rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ Due Process Clauses and the Equal Protection Clause have changed dramatically
since World War II. Moreover, courts have indicated somewhat more willingness today to
examine executive branch action during war time for consistency with basic human rights than
they did in the 1940s. As the Supreme Court stated in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Executive Branch
does not have a “blank check” even in wartime. 229
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The most famous case from the World War II era challenging the constitutionality of the
detention of civilians is, of course, Korematsu v. United States. 230 There, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld Fred Korematsu’s conviction for violating a 1942 military order excluding all
persons of Japanese ancestry from certain portions of the U.S. West Coast. 231 The Court held
that the pressing public necessity of preventing espionage or sabotage by disloyal persons of
Japanese ancestry justified deference to the military’s judgment that all persons of Japanese
ancestry must be excluded from the Pacific Coast. 232 The Korematsu decision has since been
highly criticized, including by the Supreme Court, 233 as being contrary to equal protection, and
Korematsu’s conviction was ultimately vacated, along with the two other men convicted with
him. 234 In addition, on August 10, 1988, former U.S. President Reagan signed into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1988, which ordered the payment of $20,000 to the Japanese-American survivors
of internment. 235 Further, on October 1, 1993, former U.S. President Clinton issued a letter of
apology to Mr. Korematsu calling the treatment of Japanese–Americans during the war “unjust”
and “rooted deeply in racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a lack of political leadership.” 236
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No such apology has been offered to any other ethnic groups detained during the war, such as the
Germans from Latin America. 237
Since WWII, the U.S. Supreme Court has even more firmly established that strict
scrutiny applies to classifications based on race. 238 Similarly, it has repeatedly held that state
laws that classify on the basis of alienage are subject to strict scrutiny. 239 The reaction to
Korematsu and the evolution in the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence suggests it
is likely the government would need a more compelling reason than just nationality or ancestry
to justify removing persons from their homes, families, communities and jobs and placing them
in indefinite detention today.
2.

Arrest, Detention and Trial of Unlawful Enemy Combatants

In the current war on terror, the government has relied on various exercises of statutory
and presidential authority as the basis for its arrest, detention, and trial of suspected unlawful
enemy combatants and other suspected terrorists. For example, the government has used the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 240 coupled with the President’s 2001 military
order on the “Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism,” 241 the Military Commissions Act (MCA), 242 the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
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(DTA), 243 the Military Commissions Act of 2009, 244 and various Executive Orders. 245 Some of
the relevant provisions of these authorities and how they have been interpreted by courts is
described below. In particular, the issues of indefinite detention, fair trial, and a right to counsel
are the focus of this discussion because of the parallels between the treatment of accused alien
enemies in the Latin American Detention Program and the treatment of suspected terrorists
today. 246
a. Indefinite Detention
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress authorized the
President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or
persons he determines” are responsible for those terrorist attacks. 247 The President then issued a
Military Order on November 13, 2001 authorizing the detention and trial by military commission
of non-citizens in the war on terror. 248
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 249 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the President’s
authority to detain persons for the duration of the conflict in which they were captured as a
“fundamental and accepted incident of war.” 250 In that case, an American citizen was captured
by members of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and turned over to the U.S. military there.
The U.S. government accused Hamdi of being an “enemy combatant” and asserted the authority
to hold him indefinitely without formal charges or proceedings. 251 U.S. authorities initially
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brought Hamdi to Guantanamo Bay, but then transferred him to a U.S. Navy Brig off the U.S.
coast upon learning that he was a U.S. citizen. 252 When Hamdi challenged his detention without
a hearing, the U.S. Supreme Court held that while a U.S. citizen may be detained as an enemy
combatant, that detention cannot be indefinite. Citing Article 118 of the Third Geneva
Convention, 253 the Court stated that the detention may only last as long as hostilities.254 The
Court further held that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that a U.S.
citizen be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention before a
neutral decision-maker. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court
for further proceedings. 255
Likewise, in the civil immigration context, the U.S. Supreme Court has disallowed
statutory authority that would have permitted the indefinite detention of both admissible and
inadmissible noncitizens.256 The Court stated that such indefinite detention would raise “serious
constitutional problems” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and thus interpreted
the statute to imply a reasonable limit to the amount of time an alien may be detained following
an order of removal. 257 Thus, while the executive may detain persons deemed to be
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dangerous, 258 both the U.S. Constitution and international law place limits on that power of
detention.
b.

Trial

As of this writing, hearings for suspected unlawful enemy combatants are being
conducted by way of military commissions. 259 The most recent regulations for the conduct of
military commissions under the Military Commissions Act of 2009 were issued in the form of a
revised Manual for Military Commissions (MMC) in April 2010 and are just now being
implemented. 260 This section will first describe some of the legal issues that arose under the
DTA of 2005 and then how the new MCA and MMC address those issues.
Section 1005 of the DTA authorizes the creation of Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) and Administrative Review Boards for the purpose of determining the status of the
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay and to provide annual reviews to determine the continued
need to detain aliens there. 261 The U.S. Secretary of Defense is charged with creating the
procedures for the CSRTs. However, the DTA also provides that the person designated as the
final review authority be a civilian; that the procedures provide for the consideration of any new
evidence that may become available regarding the enemy combatant status of a detainee; and that
there be consideration of the probative value of any detainee’s statement that may have been
obtained by coercion. 262 The DTA limited appeals of decisions from CSRTs and military
commissions, providing in particular that no court shall have jurisdiction to hear an application
258
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for habeas corpus filed by a detainee and that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final decision
by the CSRTs. 263
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme set up by
the DTA. 264 In Hamdan, a Yemeni national, who was allegedly Osama Bin Laden’s chauffeur,
was captured by militia forces in Afghanistan and turned over to the U.S. military. He was taken
to Guantanamo Bay in 2002; determined to be eligible for trial by military commission over a
year later; and, in mid-2004, charged with one count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by
military commission. 265
Hamdan filed a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. federal court, alleging that the military
commission the President convened lacked authority because neither Congressional action nor
the laws of war support trial by military commission for the crime of conspiracy. 266 The Court
upheld the President’s power to establish military commissions under both U.S. law and the laws
of war. 267 However, the Court held that the President’s power to convene such commissions is
also limited by the U.S. Constitution, U.S. statutes such as the UCMJ, and the international law
of war. 268
Ultimately, the Court agreed with Hamdan that the military commission convened to try
him lacked power to proceed because its structure and procedures violated the UCMJ and the
Geneva Conventions. 269 More specifically, the Court held that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions applied and that the military commission was not a “regularly constituted court
263
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affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,”
as required by that article. 270 Of relevance here, the Court held that the procedural protections
provided for detainees were insufficient because (1) the accused may be excluded from learning
what evidence is presented against him; (2) the rules permit the admission of any evidence that in
the opinion of the presiding officer has probative value; and (3) a two-thirds vote will suffice
both for a guilty verdict and a sentence (other than the death sentence). 271
The requirement of Geneva Convention Common Article 3 of “a regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by civilized
peoples” was reaffirmed in Boumediene v. Bush, another case involving the DTA. 272 There, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down portions of the Act because it unconstitutionally suspended the
writ of habeas corpus. 273 In addition, the Court noted several procedural deficiencies with
CRSTs, including that: (1) detainees are assigned a “personal representative” who is not the
detainee’s lawyer or even advocate; (2) government evidence is accorded a presumption of
validity and there are no limits on the admission of hearsay evidence (except that it be relevant
and helpful); (3) the detainee is allowed to present “reasonably available” evidence, but his
ability to rebut government evidence is limited by circumstances of confinement and lack of
counsel; and (4) the detainee can only access the unclassified portion of the “Government
Information” and so may not be aware of critical allegations against him. 274 These recent
detainee cases are remarkable in that the Supreme Court was willing to provide accused alien
270
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unlawful enemy combatants with more process than was due Korematsu, Ludecke, or Mezei and
the Court was less deferential to the Executive in a time when national security was
threatened. 275 For example, as discussed in more detail below, detainees at Guantanamo Bay
undergo periodic review of their detention and, unlike Ludecke, are now entitled to private
counsel at government expense in addition to a personal representative. Additionally, detainees
are entitled to all information relied upon by the government, except in “exceptional
circumstances,” in which case, the detainee is entitled to “a sufficient substitute or summary.” 276
Congress responded to the Boumediene decision by enacting the Military Commissions
Act of 2009. More recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented that Act by
amending the MMC in 2010. The 2010 MMC provides extensive and detailed Rules for Military
Commissions (RMCs). The MMC has jurisdiction with respect to all crimes covered by Chapter
47A of Title 10 of the United States Code and the laws of war and jurisdiction to try “any alien
unprivileged enemy belligerent.” 277 In addition, the MMC is given the power to determine
whether an alien is a privileged or unprivileged enemy combatant within the meaning of Article
V of Geneva Convention IV. 278 Trials of persons arrested and detained by the United States in
the war on terror are now being conducted pursuant to these rules. The new MMC appears to
correct many of the procedural deficiencies noted by the Supreme Court thus far. For example,
Rule 505 of the MMC provides that a defendant has a right to see evidence used against him, 279.
The new MMC also provides for the right to counsel, as explained in more detail below.
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3.

Right to Counsel

The right to counsel was just beginning to be established in U.S. law at the time of World
War II. For example, it was not until 1938 that the U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to
counsel in criminal cases in federal courts is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. 280 The Sixth Amendment was held to apply to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright. 281 Despite the prior lack of recognition of de jure
protection, it was fairly common practice by 1942 for states to provide counsel on request to
indigent defendants who were charged with capital and serious non-capital offenses. 282 Later, the
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all cases where there
is a potential loss of liberty as a result of a criminal prosecution. 283 By contrast, it is widely
recognized that no concurrent right to counsel exists for parties to civil actions. 284
In the context of immigration law, once an alien is in the United States, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the alien as a “person” against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. 285 However, an alien's right to due process in immigration
proceedings is only that process which Congress has determined is due. 286 Aliens have a
statutory right to counsel under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), but at their own
expense. 287 There is no right to counsel paid for by the government because immigration
proceedings are considered civil, not criminal. In addition to this statutory right, aliens have a
280

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
282
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 477and appendix (1942) (Black, J. dissenting).
283
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (1972).
284
Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209 (1982).
285
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973); Plyer v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any
ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been
recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”) .
286
U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S. Ct. 309, 94 L. Ed. 317 (1950); Jean v.
Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), on reh'g on other grounds, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), judgment aff'd,
472 U.S. 846, 105 S. Ct. 2992, 86 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1985).
287
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4).
281

51

Fifth Amendment procedural due process right to counsel in some cases. 288 This Fifth
Amendment right to counsel is derived from the principle that due process requires that
proceedings be fundamentally fair and lack of counsel may deprive an immigration proceeding
of its fundamental fairness. 289
The United States has struggled with the issue of access to counsel by suspected
terrorists, and has attempted to restrict the right in some cases. For example, in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 290 an American citizen accused of being an “enemy combatant” was initially
forbidden to see a lawyer at all, but was later permitted to see a lawyer only in the presence of
U.S. military observers. 291 After Hamdi’s father filed a lawsuit on his behalf, the U.S. District
Court appointed a public defender to represent him. 292 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to
finally resolve Hamdi’s claims regarding access to counsel because by the time his case reached
the Supreme Court, the Court stated that it did not need to consider the issue given that Hamdi
had been appointed counsel and had been permitted unmonitored meetings with his lawyer. 293
In Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court noted several procedural deficiencies
with respect to the CSRTs, including that detainees are assigned a “personal representative” who
is not the detainee’s lawyer or even advocate. 294 The Court’s opinion hinted, but did not
declare, that a noncitizen has a right to counsel in this context. The Court held that the CSRT
procedures, taken together, fell far short of the procedures and mechanisms that would eliminate
the need for habeas corpus review. 295
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As a result of these court decisions, Congress amended the law again with the Military
Commissions Act of 2009. As noted above, the DOD implemented the MCA by way of the
MMC in April 2010. MMC Rule 506 establishes a right to counsel at government expense. 296
Thus, the United States is now providing all detainees being tried before military commissions
with free counsel if the detainee so chooses.
B. International Law
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, treaties to which the United States
is a party are part of the supreme law of the land. 297 U.S. law also includes rules of customary
international law. 298 Both of these sources of international law contain relevant rules regarding
the detention and trial of persons during wartime and peacetime.
In 2002, then U.S. President Bush unilaterally determined that the alleged al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay were not prisoners of war (POWs) or civilians within the
meaning of Article 4 of Geneva Convention III 299 or IV 300 respectively. 301 President Bush made
this decision without first convening a competent tribunal to determine the status of the detainees
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as required by Article 5 of Geneva Convention III. 302 Such tribunals have since been established
by statute and their work is ongoing. 303
Despite initially determining that the detainees did not have a right to protected status
under the Geneva Conventions, President Bush determined that the detainees would be treated
“humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner
consistent with the principles of Geneva.” 304 In both Hamdan and Boudemiene, the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that, at a minimum, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is
applicable to the detainees. 305 Thus, although the status of these detainees under U.S. and
international law is not entirely clear, the Geneva Conventions may be used as guidance in
answering the questions posed by the arrest, detention and trial of foreigners brought to the
U.S. 306 The next section discusses relevant international law principles.
1.

Indefinite Detention and Trial

Both Geneva Convention III (POWs) 307 and Geneva Convention IV (civilians) permit
internment of prisoners of war and civilians, but civilians may be interned “only if the Security
of the Detaining Party makes it absolutely necessary.” 308 Even if a person is not a POW or a
“protected person” within the meaning of Geneva Convention IV, who is entitled to invoke the
full protections of the treaty, Article 5 of that Convention still guarantees civilians a certain
minimum level of protection, including a right to a fair and regular trial:
302
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Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or
saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security
of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military
security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication
under the present Convention.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and, in
case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed
by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges
of a protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent
with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be. 309
In addition, Geneva Convention IV states: “Protected persons accused of offenses shall be
detained in the occupied country, and if convicted, they shall serve their sentences therein.” 310
This article suggests that a country must first determine whether an accused person is a protected
person within the meaning of the Convention. If so, the transfer of the detainee to another
country for detention and trial as the United States did with many of the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay would not be consistent with the Geneva Convention.
With respect to the length of detention, Geneva Convention III also only permits
detention as long as hostilities continue. 311 Likewise, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions states that, “persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any
event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to
exist.” 312 Additionally, any internment or imprisonment of civilians must be proportionate to the
offense committed. 313 Indefinite detention is thus not permitted by international humanitarian
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law. However, in the current war on terror, it is difficult to know when, if ever, hostilities will
end.
With respect to trials, as stated above, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
requires trial of prisoners of war and detained civilians by “a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by civilized
peoples.” 314 And specifically regarding civilians, Article 71 of Geneva Convention IV states that
“no sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a
regular trial.” 315 Even persons suspected of activities hostile to the security of the State or
persons accused of being spies or saboteurs have a right to a “fair and regular trial” pursuant to
Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV. 316 Further, accused persons shall be notified of the charges
against them and brought to trial promptly. 317 They also have the right to present evidence, call
witnesses, and be represented by counsel. 318 Article 75 of Additional Protocol I further expands
on what constitutes a fair trial and includes, inter alia, a presumption of innocence until proven
guilty, as well as bans on ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, and self-incrimination. 319
International humanitarian law as reflected in the Geneva Conventions is supplemented
by international human rights law. 320 In this regard, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
declares in Article 7 that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection
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of the law without discrimination on the basis of race or national origin. 321 Article 9 states that
no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention and Article 10 guarantees a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of any criminal charges. 322
Articles 2 and 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
likewise guarantee equality before the law without discrimination. 323 The ICCPR also prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention and states that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except in
accordance with such procedures as are established by law. 324 Article 9 requires that a person
who is arrested be promptly informed of the reasons for the arrest and the charges against him. In
criminal trials, the accused have a right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. 325 Article 14 provides the right to examine witnesses. In
addition, everyone convicted of a crime has the right to have his conviction and sentence
reviewed by a higher tribunal in accordance with law. 326
The standards set forth in international humanitarian law and international human rights
law, taken together, establish the minimum level of due process guaranteed to all persons,
regardless of nationality, who are arrested, detained, and tried by any State. As a party to the
Geneva Conventions and the ICCPR, the United States is bound to follow those treaties as a
matter of law. The United States is also bound by customary international law as set forth in
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documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 327 And although national
security is a basis for derogations from certain human rights guarantees, there are both temporal
and substantive limits on the ability of a state to invoke national security to justify such
derogations. 328
These international standards must inform the development of procedures for the military
commissions used to try detainees in the war on terror, both to comply with the United States’
international legal obligations and to maintain its reputation as a country that promotes and
abides by human rights and the rule of law. 329 As of this writing, the United States is conducting
proceedings against detainees before military commissions and is using new procedures for those
commissions developed in response to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court as described
herein. 330

Whether the new procedures set forth in the 2010 MMC meet the legal requirements

for fair trials remains to be seen.
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2.

Right to Counsel in International law

International humanitarian law also provides a right to counsel, at least for civilians. In
this regard, Geneva Convention IV affords civilians “the right to be assisted by a qualified
advocate or counsel of their own choice.” 331 “Failing a choice by the accused, the Protecting
Power may provide him with an advocate or counsel.” 332 If the charges are sufficiently serious,
the Occupying Power may be required to provide counsel to the accused. 333
Article 14(3) of the ICCPR specifically addresses the right to counsel in criminal
proceedings. 334 Pursuant to Article 14(3), every criminal defendant is able to communicate with
counsel of his own choosing and to have that legal counsel assist in his defense. 335 If the
defendant cannot pay, the defendant has a right to have legal assistance assigned to him if the
interest of justice so requires. 336
The legislative history of the ICCPR suggests that the right to counsel in civil cases was
left out because it was seen as less critical because many states had already granted a civil right
while many more countries lacked the right in criminal proceedings. 337 The United States
unsuccessfully sponsored a proposal that would have granted a right to counsel in cases
involving fundamental human rights. 338 Regardless, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the
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interpretive body of the ICCPR, has made it clear that Article 14 applies to all courts and
tribunals, civilian and miltary. 339
The Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), to which the United States
also belongs, contains an explicit provision calling for the right to legal aid. 340 Adopted at the
same time, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man did not explicitly call for a
civil right to counsel, but did call for fair and easy access to courts. 341
Thus, while there is no universally recognized right to counsel in all proceedings, since
WWII there has certainly been an enormous growth in the recognition of the right to counsel in
proceedings that may result in a loss of liberty both domestically and internationally. This
evolution in our understanding of the importance of counsel may help explain why the United
States is now providing lawyers to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
V.

Parallels with the Arrest, Detention and Trial of Suspected Foreign Terrorists Today
A comparison of some of the tactics and procedures used to arrest, detain, and try “alien

enemies” during World War II with those that are being used to arrest, detain and try suspected
terrorists or “unlawful enemy combatants” today suggests that not all of the ghosts of World War
II have been exorcised. There are still some timely lessons that may be learned from the U.S.
Latin American Detention program and the treatment of “alien enemies” during times of conflict

339

Id. See UNHCR General Comment No. 32, supra note 325 at ¶ 22. In conformity with these comments, states
often address the right to civil counsel in their compliance reports and the HRC often seeks information regarding
compliance with these comments from countries appearing before it. See Davis, supra note 337 at 162. A right to
counsel in some civil matters has been found in connection with rights protected by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. See
id.
340
Charter of the Organization of the American States, art. 45(i), opened for signature Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
1609 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951).
341
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XVIII, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth
International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in
the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). The American Declaration, like the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights was not adopted as a treaty, but is considered part of customary
international law and is used to interpret the fundamental rights protected by the OAS Charter. See Buergenthal,
supra note 321 at 262.

60

that have relevance for current U.S. policies regarding suspected “unlawful enemy combatants”
today.
The accuracy of the United States’ understanding of the scope of the threat presented by
potential subversive German nationals living in Latin America around the time of WWII was
negatively influenced by the fact that the United States had inadequate intelligence and only a
rudimentary foreign intelligence service in Latin America. 342 U.S. military officers shunned
posts in Latin America “because such backwater postings were ‘prejudicial to their
promotion.’” 343 Thus, the personnel that could not avoid being assigned to Latin America tended
to be less competent and less experienced. 344
In addition, the United States lacked sufficient field operatives in Latin America who
were fluent in Spanish and other foreign languages spoken there. The FBI agents were generally
provided with little training and only two weeks of language instruction. 345 Historian Max
Friedman asserts: “The FBI, directly responsible for identifying suspects for deportation and
internment, was home to some of the most poorly informed U.S. officials working in Latin
America.” 346
Because they had “no reliable sources of their own, the FBI agents established close
working relationships with local police forces” with mixed results. 347
Asking police or military leaders in countries ruled by dictatorships for the names
of dangerous Germans often yielded a list of the dictator’s personal enemies, or
the owners of attractive real estate coveted by his friends. And the local police
officers did not necessarily display the requisite talent or honesty needed for
effective investigation. 348
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By 1943, the U.S. Justice Department expressed serious concerns about the “dangerousness”
classifications, which were often assigned to detainees by the FBI without prior investigation or
evaluation of the credibility of the information upon which the classification was based. 349
In addition, because most U.S. officials were unfamiliar with the local society and unable
to speak Spanish or German, they had to rely on local police and any other informants who
showed up at their door. 350 The U.S. often paid informants to denounce local Nazis to the U.S.
consulate. 351 However, paying bounties for information created a problem: “The trouble with
paid informants is that they are paid only if they have material to provide – a structural incentive
to invent information that contributed greatly to the inflation of the German threat in U.S.
assessments.” 352 Persons with grudges often turned in one another for reasons unrelated to
national security; for example, landlord tenant disputes or disgruntled former lovers. 353
All of these same problems have been identified in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the
Middle East in the current “war on terror.” For example, Major General Michael Flynn, the
United States’ most senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan, has criticized information
gathering there by the United States, calling U.S. intelligence about Afghanistan “clueless.” 354
Just as it offered bounties during WWII, the United States has also air-dropped flyers in
Afghanistan offering large monetary rewards for information about suspected terrorists or
Taliban members. 355 Many persons in Afghanistan used this offer as an opportunity to settle
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tribal grudges and get rid of rivals. 356 Studies show that 93% of the detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay were not captured by U.S. forces. 357 The U.S. Commander in charge of
Guantanamo Bay detainees was quoted as saying: “Sometimes, we just didn't get the right folks.
. . . Commanders now estimate that up to 40% of the 549 current detainees probably pose no
threat and possess no significant information.” 358 As of 2009, three-quarters of the 774 prisoners
sent to Guantanamo have been released. 359 The U.S. government also has repeatedly stated that
it does not have sufficient personnel with the necessary skills in language, culture, and
appropriate intelligence gathering techniques to allow for full and effective communication in
Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries. 360
Another parallel between the U.S. Latin American Detention Program in WWII and the
fight against terrorism today is that the United States responded to the threat in each case by
creating a registration program for certain aliens. At the Third Meeting of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in 1942, Resolution XVII was adopted
recommending that all aliens be required to register and periodically report in person to the
proper authorities and that strict supervision be exercised over the activities of all nationals of
member States of the Tripartite Pact. 361
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The majority of the American Republics responded positively to this recommendation,
adopting or updating laws that required the registration and identification of aliens within their
territory. The Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense later
adopted Resolution VI in 1942 on the Registration of Aliens, which encouraged any State that
had not already done so to adopt similar laws and set forth recommended minimum standards for
any such program. 362
Likewise, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
the United States implemented a new registration program for Arabs and Muslims in the United
States. 363 The U.S. Justice Department selected more than 50,000 young immigrant men for
interviews, virtually all of whom were Arabs or Muslims.364 On September 11, 2002, the Justice
Department initiated a new program requiring foreign nationals from selected countries to
register at entry and at one-year intervals thereafter. 365 It also applied similar requirements to all
male nonimmigrants over the age of 16 who were already living in the United States. 366 Once
again, virtually all of the targeted countries of nationality were Arab or Muslim. 367 These
programs are essentially a form of racial profiling, which has been criticized as an ineffective
law enforcement tool 368 and has been limited due to concerns that it may violate the Fourth
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Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 369
During World War II, the Americas justified the Latin American detention program by
arguing that the new threat presented by the Axis powers necessitated the adoption of new laws,
some of which may be less respectful of civil liberties. For example, one annual report of the
Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense states:
Peace-time legislation could not meet the Axis pattern of total attack, predicated
on an intense and world-wide campaign of political aggression, any more than the
Panzer division or the Stuka bomber could be checked by the primitive
technology of trench warfare. Laws not drafted in contemplation of the
widespread subversive organization of totalitarian agents, and which do not take
into account their ever-changing tactics and maneuvers, cannot offer the legal,
administrative or psychological basis for an effective political defense and a
vigorous counter-attack. 370
Likewise, the Bush Administration repeatedly responded to its critics with similar
reasoning, arguing that international law was developed for relations between States, not for nonstate actors like terrorist organizations. 371 It has been further argued that terrorist organizations
present a new kind of threat requiring new kinds of responses, including the development of new
laws. For example, in an address to a joint session of Congress shortly after the terrorist attacks
of 2001, President Bush stated: “Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on
thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a
different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.” 372 He also states that “we face
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new and sudden national challenges” and that “[w]e will come together to give law enforcement
the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home.” 373 In 2002, Attorney General
John Ashcroft stated: “This unprecedented assault brought us face to face with a new enemy, and
demanded that we think anew and act anew in order to protect our citizens and our values.” 374
This theme continued through 2005, when President Bush stated in a press conference, “we
quickly learned that al Qaeda was not a conventional enemy . . . This new threat required us to
think and act differently.” 375 He then describes the new law enforcement tools created by the
Patriot Act, 376 many of which have been criticized as improperly infringing on individual
liberties. 377
In WWII, various U.S. officials sometimes argued that since the enemy violated the law,
the enemy should not benefit from legal protections. However, the United States has been
somewhat schizophrenic in its adherence to this argument. For example, in the Explanatory
Statement to Resolution XX on the Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis Nationals, the
CPD Defense stated:
[I]n exercising their powers of detention and expulsion, the American Republics,
including those not at war with the Axis, have wisely concluded that the Axis
should not be permitted to take advantage of domestic respect for traditional
concepts of International Law in order to continue their reprehensible activities in
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this Hemisphere, using as protection for their machinations the guarantees of the
very democracy they are seeking to destroy. 378
Yet, one paragraph later, the Committee recommends that the American Republics follow the
detention guidelines set forth in the Geneva Conventions of July 27, 1929 relative to the
treatment of prisoners of war. 379 This recommendation was not made for purely humanitarian
reasons, however. The Committee wanted to follow the Convention to try to ensure reciprocal
treatment for American citizens held in Axis-dominated territory. 380
The historical record described above shows that the United States detained German
nationals during WWII in part to prevent them from assisting the enemy, whether militarily by
returning to the battlefield or economically by supplying the enemy with needed goods.
Likewise, several U.S. government officials have recently asserted that it is necessary to detain
suspected enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict to prevent their return to the
battlefield. For example, in a 2002 Department of Defense briefing, then Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld stated: “As has been the case in previous wars, the country that takes prisoners
generally decides that they would prefer them not to go back to the battlefield. They detain those
enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict.” 381
In Hamdi, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed this reasoning, stating that “detention to
prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war.” 382 The
problem in both cases, however, is that many of the persons arrested and detained were not
378

Explanatory Statement to Resolution XX on Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis Nationals (1943), in
Appendix to the Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 77
(1943).
379
Id. at 78. The Committee recognized that the Convention was not strictly applicable because it referred only to
prisoners of war and not civilians.
380
Id.
381
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense Briefing (Mar. 28, 2002), quoted in Mark Denbeaux et al.,
Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense Data 4
(Feb. 8, 2006), available at
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf.
382
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).

67

enemy combatants and had no intention of fighting on the battlefield. 383 The United States is
still struggling to create a system that is capable of properly distinguishing between those who do
present a threat and those who do not. In addition, in the current war on terror, no end to the
hostilities is in sight, leading to the specter of indefinite detention. Lengthy detentions have
brought demands for hearings to determine whether the proper persons were being detained.
Just as jurisdiction was established over Germans from Latin America by accusing them
of being alien enemies and bringing them to the United States during World War II for detention
and trial; likewise, the U.S. asserts jurisdiction over accused alien unlawful enemy combatants
captured elsewhere and brought to Guantanamo Bay as part of the current war on terror. In both
time periods, many of these persons were to have hearings outside regular U.S. courts in other
types of tribunals. As of today, only a handful of trials by military commission are underway, in
part because of the multiplicity of legal challenges to the lack of procedural protections afforded
the defendants in the proposed military tribunals. 384
In reviewing these challenges, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance
of deference to the authority of the President in the face of a serious threat to national security,
but has also reminded us that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes
to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.” 385 Because the war on terror may be indefinite, the Court
has held that detainees are entitled to some measure of due process. 386 However, the Court has
said that certain evidentiary rules may be relaxed due to the government’s need to maintain focus
and secrecy in its war on terror. 387
383

See Fox, supra note 21 at 106 (“Secretary of State James Byrnes had admitted in 1945 that deportation mistakes
were made in Latin America.”).
384
A list of the persons being tried by military commission may be found at,
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx.
385
Id. at 536. Hamdi was a U.S. citizen.
386
See id. at 533.
387
See id.

68

As noted above, the United States’ use of military commissions was challenged in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 388 where the Supreme Court held that the government may use military
commissions, but must do so in a manner consistent with domestic and international law.
According to the Court, military commissions have been used “to seize and subject to
disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede the military effort
have violated the law of war.” 389 However, the Supreme Court found several major procedural
deficiencies with the military commission procedures, leading the court to stop their use until
those deficiencies were addressed. The Supreme Court again considered challenges to the use of
military commissions to determine combatant status in Boumediene v. Bush. 390 Here, too, the
Court noted several deficiencies in the procedures to be used by the CRSTs. 391 Following these
cases, the U.S. government has apparently corrected many of these procedural deficiencies
through the new MMC. Therefore, it may be that the military commissions now more fully
comply with both U.S. and international law.
VI. Lessons to be Learned
Many criticisms have been leveled at the United States for its internment of persons of
Japanese and German nationality or ancestry during World War II. Despite some changes in
both domestic and international law, as described above, criticisms continue to be leveled at the
United States for its detention and trial of unlawful enemy combatants or suspected terrorists.
Thus, while it appears that the United States may have learned some lessons from history, there
is clearly more to learn. As the U.S. Supreme Court recently stated in Hamdi: “History and
common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries with it the potential to
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become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of [immediate
national security] threat.” 392 The U.S. government must continue to work towards doing a better
job of balancing national security and individual liberties.
In his book, Enemy Aliens, David Cole describes the United States’ tendency in times of
crisis to sacrifice the liberty of non-United States citizens in exchange for a sense of greater
security for U.S. citizens. 393 Cole argues that striking the balance between liberty and security in
this way is tempting because citizens retain their rights, while the targeted noncitizens have no
voice in the political process to protest their treatment. 394 However, Cole argues that the United
States should resist the temptation to trade the liberty of foreign nationals for the security of
United States citizens for four reasons. 395
First, the distinction between citizens and noncitizens is illusory in the long run. What
we allow our government to do to immigrants today becomes a template for how the government
treats citizens tomorrow. 396
Second, restricting liberties of noncitizens is likely to prove counterproductive as a
security matter because it undermines our legitimacy and hinders law enforcement’s ability to
work effectively with local communities. 397 Both historically and today, the United States has
suffered a loss of reputation in the international community for its failure to abide by the rule of
law and to respect human rights. 398 This loss of reputation has in turn undermined the United
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States’ ability to carry out its agenda on an international scale, whether that is fighting terrorism,
state building, or combating the drug trade. 399 In the international fight against terrorism, where
the terrorists operate in multiple countries, such international contributions and cooperation are
essential. 400
Third, treating noncitizens as having fewer rights often is a critical factor in the later
regretted pattern of government overreaction in times of crises. 401 And fourth, Cole argues that
trading foreigners’ rights for citizens’ security is constitutionally and morally wrong. 402
Both the WWII-era U.S. Latin American Detention Program and the current fight against
terrorism exemplify many of Cole’s themes. While none of the persons detained in the Latin
American Detention Program were U.S. citizens, the restrictions on liberties of noncitizens
during WWII led directly to McCarthyism following the war and the corresponding restrictions
on the individual freedoms of U.S. citizens. 403 By contrast, both citizens and noncitizens have
been accused of being enemy combatants in the last ten years and have been subjected to
unconstitutional practices, demonstrating again how easily the lines may blur.
As has also been described above, the U.S. Latin American Detention Program was not
particularly effective in identifying persons who were true threats to the United States. While the
current war on terror may ultimately result in a better success rate, the U.S. government has
admitted that large numbers of those initially detained are not connected to the Taliban or Al
399
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Qaeda. These numbers point to government overreaction to a threat in both time periods. These
programs also wasted precious government resources during times of crisis on many persons
who were ultimately determined to be not particularly dangerous. 404
If the United States is going to continue to rely on unknown informants and use bounties
to identify suspected enemy aliens, it needs to do more investigation before deciding to remove
the suspect from his or her country of nationality for detention and trial elsewhere. One option
would be to conduct hearings in the country where the person is apprehended, as contemplated
under Article 5 of Geneva Convention III, to make an initial determination as to whether the
person actually is a threat to the United States. 405 International law creates a presumption in
favor of detention in occupied territory or a location closer to that person’s home to prevent
return to the battlefield if that person is determined to be a threat.
And while the Supreme Court upheld the government’s program of detaining persons of
Japanese or German descent during WWII, most people now regard those decisions as wrong. In
the current war on terror, the Supreme Court has been somewhat more willing to review the
executive branch’s actions and measure them against the requirements of individual rights such
as due process. And the executive branch of government has responded to these court decisions
by increasing procedural protections for persons being tried by military commissions, as is
demonstrated by the most recent version of the Rules for Military Commissions.
In his book, Cole’s primary purpose is to show that the phenomenon of government
overreaction is inextricably tied to the double standards the United States employs with respect
to citizens and noncitizens in times of crisis. 406 He suggests that to the correct the problem, we
treat citizens and noncitizens equally with respect to basic constitutional rights such as due
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process, equal protection, and the First Amendment freedoms of religion, speech and
association. 407 As another scholar has stated: “It is . . . precisely during times of war or other
perceived crises – times that our civil liberties are most easily lost – that we must most diligently
guard our rights and insist on lawful conduct by the government.” 408 As the comparison between
the U.S. Latin American Detention Program and the current war on terror shows, we have made
strides in that direction. However, there is still more work to be done to find the proper balance
between individual liberties and national security.
VII. Conclusion
Many actions were taken against persons believed to be enemy aliens during WWII over which
the United States now expresses serious regret. While perhaps technically legal at the time, the
mass arrests, deportations, and lengthy detentions of accused alien enemies on the basis of often
specious evidence was unjust, a waste of resources, and damaging to the U.S. reputation abroad.
The United States appears to have learned some lessons from that experience. In the current
fight against terrorism, U.S. courts are providing more stringent review of government action to
protect individual rights and the U.S. government is responding to those court directives by
providing greater protections. However, the U.S. government still initially went too far in
favoring national security over individual liberties when faced with terrorist threats. As in
WWII, it arrested and detained many persons on flimsy allegations, transported them far from
home, locked them up indefinitely, and limited their procedural rights when they demanded
hearings to prove their innocence. Thus, while the United States has exorcised many of the
ghosts from the World War II Latin American Detention Program, some of those ghosts still
haunt Guantanamo.
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